In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.
Introduction
It has become common practice for firms to pool their expertise in partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organizational problem in partnerships is that rather than coordinating their efforts, managers may behave noncooperatively to advance the interests of their parent firms. This problem is extensively dis-1 ( ) cussed in the literature on strategic alliances. Harrigan 1988 , for example, reports that less than half of cooperative alliances are We wish to thank Albert Ma and Michael Riordan for very useful comments. We also wish to thank Bob Anderson, Eddie Dekel, Ben Hermalin, Michael Katz, Rachel Kranton, Matthew Rabin, and Suzanne Scotchmer for criticism on earlier drafts. Two anonymous referees and a coeditor provided useful comments.
. See, for example, Hall 1984 , Harrigan 1985 , Hladik 1984 , Killing 1983 , ( ) ( ) Kogut 1989 , and Goldenberg 1988 . considered successful by all parents. In light of this evidence, we ask whether contracts can be designed so that partnerships maximize joint profits.
We consider a model where firms' valuations of a partnership are private information, reflecting what they know about their ability to market and use the output. The valuations are drawn from distributions that are endogenously determined by the effort choices of the firms. The combination of moral hazard and asymmetric information gives rise to two problems. First, a firm may wish to expend effort in enhancing its own private valuation at the expense of the partner's valuation. Second, when the partnership is dissolved, the firm with the lower valuation may inefficiently assume full ownership. Full efficiency requires solving both of these problems.
Many alliances in research and development fit the structure of our model. For example, firms with complementary core competencies form alliances to conduct joint work on new products. Once a product is developed, however, the complementarity between partners disappears and the partnership terminates. In biotechnology, one partner is often a large pharmaceutical and the other a small R & D boutique. If the project yields a product that is useful to the pharmaceutical, the pharmaceutical buys out the boutique and takes the product through the marketing and distribution stages.
2 Otherwise, the boutique may obtain full rights to the product and move on to seek an alternate pharmaceutical partner. A more subtle example is alliances that are used as precursers to acquisitions. In these alliances firms work together for a period to explore the possibility of a buyout. 3 In our model, there are two partners. Each partner has an agenda. The two agendas are represented by a binary effort choice. When effort is coordinated, both partners follow the same agenda. As a consequence, one partner is ''dominant'' in the sense that it is more likely to have a high private valuation. For instance, in a biotechnology alliance, the dominant partner is most likely to be the pharmaceutical company. In an alliance that is a precurser to an acquisition, the dominant partner is the firm that hopes to make the acquisition.
We consider environments where private valuations are uniformly distributed across intervals that depend on the efforts. We find that first best contracts exist for a reasonable subset of these 2. For an empirical study of technology transfer in this type of alliance, see Pisano ( ) environments . We find that the main contractual difficulty is the problem of inducing effort coordination. A partnership can always be terminated efficiently, but effort may not always be coordinated. We discuss how changes in the underlying parameters of the valuation distributions affect the difficulty of the effort coordination problem. We develop a simple sufficiency condition for existence of a first best contract according to which the dominant partner must be sufficiently dominant.
We also show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership structure of the partnership. We identify a division of ownership shares for which the partnership can always be dissolved efficiently. Under this division, the dominant firm has the larger share.
( ) The result extends a result by Cramton et al. 1987 which says that when partners' valuations are drawn from symmetric distributions, the equal-shares partnership can always be dissolved efficiently. The intuition for our result is straightforward. The dominant firm is more likely to assume full ownership at termination. If this firm begins with a higher initial ownership share, then the expected number of shares traded at termination is low. The shares that maximize efficiency at dissolution essentially minimize the occurrence of trade. 4 In the second part of our analysis, we evaluate the performance of two termination rules that are commonly used to dissolve partnerships. Under the first rule, one partner proposes a price and the other decides whether to buy or sell at that price. We refer to this as the shotgun rule. Under the second rule, both partners submit bids and the high bidder buys the shares of the low bidder at a price equal to the higher bid. We refer to this rule as price competition. A contract is given by a termination rule together with an arbitrary division of ( ownership shares. For each rule, we characterize the contract i.e., the ) ownership shares that maximize joint profits.
We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency in our environments, they both perform well. As in our first-best analysis, we find that the shares that maximize efficiency in dissolution give the dominant firm a larger share. This is true for both rules and follows from the same intuition as for the first best contracts. These shares however are not optimal for effort coordination. Intuitively, the closer the subordinate firm is to being a residual 4. With informational asymmetries, agents can potentially earn rents from their private information. When there is less need for trade, there are fewer possibilities for rent seeking, and so incentives leading to efficient trade are easier to establish. The least auspicious share structure gives the dominant firm a share of zero. In this case a ( ) result of Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983 shows that dissolution is never efficient.
( ) claimant full ownership , the more willing it is to maximize joint ( ) profits by coordinating effort . Under both rules, the choice of shares thus involves a trade-off. To maximize termination efficiency, the dominant firm should have a larger share. To induce effort coordination, the subordinate firm may need to have a larger share. The optimal shares balance these opposing tendencies.
Neither rule terminates the partnership will full efficiency. However, we find that with the share structures that are optimal for termination, the efficiency losses are very small. The more important comparison between the rules is in how they coordinate effort. In the environments we consider, we find that the shotgun rule is better than price competition at inducing effort coordination. The reason is that when effort is coordinated, the dominant firm is likely to have the higher valuation for the partnership. The subordinate firm must be able to collect some of this value to benefit from coordination. Under the shotgun rule, the subordinate firm can simply propose a high price for its shares. That is, the subordinate firm can use its position as proposer to claim some of the dominant firm's returns.
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Under price competition, the subordinate firm's pricing strategy is constrained by the pricing strategy of the dominant firm. If the dominant firm is bidding low, the subordinate firm must also bid low or run the risk of acquiring the partnership itself. Consequently, the subordinate firm is less able to benefit when the dominant firm receives high valuations.
We find that the shotgun rule is generally the better of the two rules, because of the importance of effort coordination. However, the rules cannot be ranked. Price competition is slightly more efficient at termination, because the price reflects the bids of both partners rather than just one. In this sense price competition is more similar to an auction. When effort coordination is easy to achieve, price competition is often the better rule.
Our work contributes to the literature on termination of partner-( ) ships Cramton et al., 1987; McAfee 1992 in two ways. First, the previous literature considers only the question of whether assets will be allocated efficiently at termination. We analyze the feedback effect that these rules have on firms' efforts. Effort coordination turns out to be a difficult problem and one that conflicts with termination efficiency. A priori, contracts that perform well at allocating the assets may be undesirable because they discourage efficient investment in ( ) the partnership. We show that in contrast to McAfee 1992 , in some 5. We assume that the subordinate firm is the proposer and the dominant firm is the chooser. The shotgun rule would not perform as well if the roles were reversed. environments the shotgun rule outperforms price competition.
6 Second, we extend their results on the efficiency of partnership termination to the case of asymmetric distributions. As discussed above, we ( ) extend the result of Cramton et al. 1987 on efficient shares for partnership dissolution. We also show that neither the relative-ef-( ficiency ranking of price competition and the shotgun rule McAfee, ) 1992, pp. 268 ] 269 nor the efficiency of price competition is robust to this change. Structurally, the model we consider is related to the holdup ( ) problem, which goes back to Klein et al. 1978 and Williamson ( ) 1979 . This problem has been examined in a variety of institutional contexts.
7 Most of the existing literature, however, assumes independence: each firms' effort affects only its valuation. In these models, moral hazard arises because effort is costly. Our research contributes to the literature by examining effort incentives in a setting where the distributions of agents' private information are interdependent. In our model, effort is costless and a moral hazard arises precisely from the lack of independence-in enhancing its own valuation, a firm diminishes its partner's valuation. The only other place that we have ( ) seen an assumption of this type is Che and Hausch 1996 . Che and Hausch examine a holdup problem in which a seller's effort determines a buyer's valuation of a good. The valuation is observable prior to trade, but not contractible. They find that first best contracts exist in this environment.
Finally, an alternative contractual solution to our holdup problem is merger. In a full merger, the moral-hazard problem that we consider could be solved by eliminating one of the two managements. However, administrative restructuring is costly. Moreover, if the productive period of joint work has an end date after which it becomes advantageous to dissolve the merger, the costs of restructuring must be incurred twice. It is therefore when the economic benefit ( ) of joint work is temporary as in our model that a merger is least likely to be an optimal organizational form.
6. McAfee also considers a third rule, the loser ' s-bid auction, where both partners submit bids and the high bidder buys the shares of the low bidder at a price equal to ( ) the lower bid. McAfee finds that the ''winner's-bid auction'' our price competition is better than the loser's-bid auction in a symmetric environment. Although similar to a second-price auction, the rule does not induce the partners to bid their true valuations.
( ) 7. Grossman and Hart 1986 show that joint ownership can lead to inefficiently ( ) ( ) low levels of investment by both firms. Rogerson 1984 and Shavell 1980 study the performance of common court remedies for breach of contract in inducing efficient ( ) investment. Hermalin and Katz 1993 argue that simple contracts can achieve the first ( ) best when courts merely act as contract enforcers. Rogerson 1992 presents a general analysis proving the existence of first-best mechanisms that solve holdup problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the model. In Section 3, we discuss first best contracts. In Section 4, we consider simple termination rules. Section 5 discusses robustness of the results, and Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We model the partnership as a two-stage game with two firms. Each firm begins the game with an ownership share representing a claim on output. In the first stage, firms contribute to the partnership by choosing efforts that affect joint profits. In the second stage, firms privately learn their own valuation of the output. After firms learn their valuations, they terminate the partnership. If one partner has a higher valuation, then it is efficient for that partner to claim the entire output. The game structure is common knowledge. Timing in the model is shown in Figure 1 .
Effort
We label the firms A and B. Suppose that each decides on an effort that is unobservable and hence not contractible. We denote the efforts v 4
by e , e g A, B . The binary effort set represents two distinct agen- A B das. The choice between agendas is costless, indicating a direction rather than a level of work. While the general problem of providing incentives for agents to work hard arises in all firm structures, partnerships, in addition, are distinguished by the divided loyalties of split management. The diverging goals of the partners, captured here by directional effort, can lead to inefficiency.
FIGURE 1. THE TIMELINE
In order to maximize joint profits the firms must follow firm A's agenda, so that e s e s A. 8 The heart of the problem is providing the subordinate firm B incentives to coordinate to the dominant firm A's agenda. Thus we will suppress the dominant firm's coordination incentives, assuming that only firm B has an effort choice. We then ask the simpler question of whether it is always possible to write a contract under which firm B is willing to choose e s A in an equilibrium.
Valuations
The relationship between effort and the valuations of output is stochastic. This assumption captures the uncertainty in new product development and R & D. It is because of this uncertainty that termination is an important source of concern in partnership contracts. In stage 2, after firm B has chosen its direction of effort, the firms privately learn their valuations. mizes joint profits is identical to the case we consider, and if joint profit maximization requires the firms to pursue their own agendas, the incentive problem is eliminated.
valuations are independent. While a firm knows its own valuation, it does not know the valuation of its partner. However, in equilibrium, both firms know firm B's choice of effort direction e. Hence, in equilibrium, firm i's belief about the distribution of firm j's valuae ( ) w tion is given by the distribution F v . When the effort choice is clear j from the context, we will denote the distribution and its density by ( ) ( ) x F v and f v , respectively.
i i
We will assume that by following its own agenda, firm B maximizes its own valuation at the expense of firm A's valuation. That is:
The realized value of the partnership depends on who claims the output. If firm A claims all the output, then the value v is Our assumption that joint profit maximization requires e s A now becomes
A B
For tractability in our analysis, we will consider uniform distributions of firm valuations. We specify these distributions to be consistent with the above assumptions.
Assumption U:
9. In some cases, it may not be physically possible to split the output of a joint venture. However, in many cases this assumption is a reasonable abstraction of split ownership. For instance, if partners comarket a jointly developed product in different geographical markets, then they can split the output by dividing customer lists.
Ownership
We model ownership as a claim on output. Let the ownership shares w x of the two firms be given by u g 0, 1 , and u s 1 y u . We assume
that these shares are given at the start of the partnership. When the partnership terminates, firm i has the right to retain the portion u of i output for a realized value of u v . In order to achieve an efficient i i division of output, these shares will have to be altered ex post so that the firm with the higher valuation receives the entire output. However, the initial ownership shares are still important, since they determine a minimum payoff that each firm must receive at termination.
Contracts
In the first part of our analysis, we ask whether there exists a contract that guarantees an efficient outcome to the partnership. To address this question we use the theory of Bayesian mechanism design. By ( ) the revelation principle see, e.g., Myerson, 1985 any outcome that is achieved as an equilibrium outcome under any contractual agreement can be represented by a truth-telling equilibrium under some direct revelation mechanism. Our question is whether there exists a direct relevant mechanism in which partners first coordinate their efforts and then terminate the partnership efficiently.
The following notation is standard. Let s denote a firm's owner-( ship share at termination. This will generally differ from the firm's ) initial ownership share. If the firm has valuation v and receives a monetary transfer t, then its payoff at termination is given by sv q t. We require the contract between the firms to be ex post budgetbalanced. Namely, the partnership cannot rely on any outside subsidies to finance its dissolution. This is satisfied if
Suppose that firm B chooses the effort direction A. For truth telling to be an equilibrium of the game, the mechanism must be incentive-compatible . It has to induce both firms to report their valuations truthfully. The incentive-compatibility constraint is given by
In addition, the mechanism has to induce firm B to coordinate its effort by choosing the effort direction A. That is, firm B cannot benefit by choosing the effort direction B and then lying about its valuation of the partnership. This effort constraint for firm B is given by
The initial ownership shares also determine a contractual constraint. After learning its private valuation v , we assume that a firm i with ownership share u may choose between claiming its output for i a payoff of u v and participating in the mechanism. We therefore i i y : require the mechanism s, t to satisfy the interim individual rationality constraint
Finally, the mechanism is ex post efficient if it induces the efficient effort e s A and upon termination assigns the ownership of the venture to the firm that values it most. That is, the ex post ownership share s has to satisfy
10. Note that we use the notation of Bayesian incentive compatibility rather than the more appealing notion of incentive compatibility in dominant strategies. As Green ( ) and Laffont 1979 showed, dominant incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot satisfy ex post budget balance.
11. When players in a game take actions that affect the distributions of types, then the revelation principle allows us to restrict attention to mechanisms in which truth telling occurs given the equilibrium action, but not given other actions. For this reason, we must consider the possibility that firm B lies given e s B.
First-Best Analysis
In this section, we address the question of whether there exists an ex post budget-balanced contract that coordinates firms' effort, is individually rational for each firm, and terminates the partnership efficiently.
Despite the simplicity of our model, it is difficult to obtain a complete characterization of environments where such contracts exist. infinite-dimensional space of potential mechanisms yielding the correct expected payments when e s A and varying payments when e s B. Some of these may satisfy the effort constraint, while others may not. The direct revelation principle is thus of limited help in deciding whether the efficient choice of effort is implementable. Given this, it is hard to pin down a necessary condition for simultaneous satisfaction of both incentive compatibility and the effort constraint. We therefore focus on the sufficiency question and ask whether any of a family of reasonable potential mechanisms induce firm B to choose the efficient effort.
Consider the family of mechanisms s , t where s is given
A by the termination efficiency condition. The transfer payment t n is 12. For discrete distributions of valuations, it is possible to formulate the problem as a linear programming problem. For specific parameters, we can then completely characterize the environments for which first best contracts exist by solving the problem numerically. However, a significant degree of intuition is lost in this approach.
given by
and n is a positive number.
It is straightforward to show that the above contracts induce firms to report their valuations truthfully when e s A. By construction, they terminate the partnership efficiently and are budget-bal-( ) anced. Therefore they solve the contractual problem provided they 1 ( ) induce e s A and 2 are individually rational for both firms.
To gain intuition for the form of these mechanisms, note that if e s A, ex post efficient termination and incentive compatibility imply ative, it reduces firm B's payment significantly 13 and so strengthens B's incentive to choose the effort direction A. In the next proposition, we describe the n that gives firm B the strongest incentives to follow A's agenda. The optimal n cannot be too large. If n is very large, then firm B may wish to choose the effort direction B and subsequently the next proposition shows, the optimal n is such that n s (
a r a b r b ) 0 ) a y a n r a y a .
Effort Coordination
For now, we relax the individual rationality constraint. In the following proposition, we determine the value of n for which the contract y U n : s , t maximizes firm B's incentive to choose e s A. We use this to y U n : provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the contract s , t to be ex post efficient. Let
The choice of effort affects both firms' valuations. That is, firm B's incentive to coordinate is determined both by the direct effect of w x w x effort on E V and the indirect effect on E V . The parameter r 
B
In the extreme case that there is no direct effect at all, we have that b s b X and r s 1. We prove the proposition in the appendix. Intuition for the ( ) condition S is given as follows. Suppose that there is no direct effect of effort on firm B's valuation, so that r s 1. Choosing e s A maximizes firm A's expected valuation at no direct cost to firm B. However, firm B is more likely to acquire the output when e s B. The possibility of acquiring the output for a payment lower than its ( ) private valuation generates an incentive to deviate. From S we see that if firm B's expected valuation is sufficient small, then B does not deviate. up to a constant. Given this, it is easy to show that firm A has no incentive to ( ) misreport v . See the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the distributions of firms' valuations satisfy the inequality
2 X X 2 ( ) a a q a a 3 ( ) G r b . S 2 y U n : ( X )( X ) Then
A
Holding r fixed at r s 1, we consider how changes in the distributional parameters affect firm B's incentive to coordinate. w Increasing a strengthens this incentive that is, weakens condition ( )x S . Coordination is more valuable for higher a. Surprisingly, increasing a X also strengthens this coordination incentive. Although a coordination failure involves greater joint profits, firm B's ability to acquire the output on favorable terms is reduced. An increase in b s b X weakens the incentive to coordinate. For both effort choices, firm B contributes more to joint profits and its chance of acquiring the output is increased. The increase in firm B's payoff is greater when e s B, because firm A provides less competition for the output at termination.
For r ) 1, the analysis is more complex. An increase in b X ( ) weakens firm B's incentive to coordinate through an increase in r . Not only does e s B result in greater joint profits, but firm B is more likely to acquire the output. An increase in a also unambiguously strengthens firm B's incentive to coordinate. An increase in B however has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, coordination becomes relatively more valuable. On the other hand, when it deviates firm B must report a valuation less than or equal to b. It cannot has an ambiguous effect when r ) 1. The incentive to coordinate is ( ) X strengthened for the same reason as when r s 1 if and only if a is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the improvement in joint profits that results from an increase in a X weakened the incentive to coordinate.
( ) By weakening condition S , we obtain the following corollary. The proof relies strongly on the stochastic dominance properties ( ) 15 embodied in Assumption U Section 2.2 .
Corollary 1: Suppose that the distributions of firms' valuations sat-
where n s a r a b r b , is ex post budget-balanced, efficient, and Bayesian incentive-compatible.
The corollary says that if the dominant firm is sufficiently dominant then a first best contract exits. The corollary requires that firm A's individual valuation distribution is dominant both when effort is coordinated and when it is not. A high value of a and a low 15. It is clear from the proof of the proposition that a first best contract exists if ( ) condition S is satisfied even if stochastic dominance fails.
value of b X mean that the advantage of coordinating effort is high and firm B's ability to gain by not coordinating effort is low. That a low value of b and a high value of a X can help follows from our previous discussion. With individual rationality relaxed, Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition identifying environments for which a contract implementing the first best outcome exists. Because the space of incentive-compatible mechanisms does not admit a simple characterization, we cannot verify that a first best contract fails to exist in those environments that do not satisfy the condition. However, we can show that the first best contract fails to exist for discrete versions of some of these environments. 
Individual Rationality
We now examine the way in which the ownership shares affects the feasibility of the first best contract. That is, we ask for what ownery U n : ship structures the contracts s , t are individually rational. For any partnership, there exist many ownership shares that are not consistent with any individually rational and incentive compatible contract. Suppose, for instance, that one partner initially owns all of the partnership. Then at termination, the incentive problem can be stated as a trading problem. The partners should switch over the ownership to the other partner if that partner has the higher of two ( ) valuations. As Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983 showed, this type of ( ) trade is always inefficient. On the other hand, Cramton et al. 1987 showed that if the partners have identically distributed valuations, then equal share ownership structures can always be dissolved efficiently.
We extend this result to asymmetric distributions. We find that ( 
The intuition behind the proposition is that the ownership structure must be close to the ex post efficient ownership structure. Because A is the dominant firm, it is most likely to be the owner of The shares that maximize efficiency at dissolution essentially minimize the occurrence of trade.
The following result follows immediately from the Proof of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2: If a budget-balanced, efficient, and Bayesian incentivecompatible contract exists, then it is also individually rational for a nonempty (
U U ) convex set of shares centered around the point u , u .
A B
Example 1: Direct analysis shows that for the environments that y U n : are described in Proposition 1, the mechanism s , t is individually ( ) rational with respect to any ownership structure u , u that satisfies
u F min a r 3b , 1 and u F min b r 3 a , 3 q b r 6 a .

Simple Contracts
First-best contracts have the disadvantage of being complex in the ( sense that they depend on the parameters of the environment which X X ) in this case are a, a , b, and b . We are therefore interested in studying what is the extent of efficiency loss that is associated with using simple contracts that are independent of the particular environment in which the firms interact. In this section we analyze the performance of a restricted set of simple contracts. These contracts are stylized versions of contracts that are commonly used in partnerships. We consider their performance in environments for which a first-best contract exists. Consequently we may use maximized joint profits as a performance benchmark. The contracts we consider combine a fixed termination game with an arbitrary division of owner-ship shares. At termination the firms can renegotiate their initial ownership shares, but this renegotiation follows a fixed set of bargaining rules. We consider two institutional arrangements. In the first, which we refer to as the shotgun rule, one partner names a price and the other partner decides whether to buy or sell his shares at that price. In the second, the firms engage in a price competition to determine which firm will sell its share to the other and at what price.
The Shotgun Rule
The shotgun rule, also known as the ''Texas auction'' and the ''cakecutting rule,'' is one of the most common termination rules. In our analysis we first look at its ability to dissolve the partnership efficiently. We then consider this incentive for effort coordination.
( ) The shotgun mechanism specifies a proposer P and a chooser ( ) C . At the date of termination, the proposer sets a price. The chooser has three options. It can sell its share to the proposer for the specified price, buy the proposer's share for the specified price, or refuse to trade. The right to refuse to trade guarantees the individual rationality of the shotgun rule.
17
Let u denote the proposer's share, and let p be the proposed P price. The chooser's strategy is to buy the venture if the price is lower than its valuation and to sell its share if the price is higher than its valuation. The proposer's expected profit when its valuation is v is
The following lemma characterizes the properties of the price function.
solution for p to d r dp P v , p s 0, is continuous and nondecreasing, P P ( ) 17. It is easy to see that 1 for any proposed price and any valuation of the chooser, ( ) ( ) the chooser will always be weakly better off trading than not trading, and 2 the proposer always prefers setting a price to not trading. Thus the proposer's individual rationality constraint is also trivially satisfied.
18. A version of this lemma holds for any distributions of valuations that satisfy the ( ) standard hazard-rate conditions. See McAfee 1992 for details. However, there is a useful intuition associated with this result. When ( ) ( ) the proposer sells buys shares, it prefers a higher lower price. If u P increases, the proposer trades more shares when it sells and fewer shares when it buys. This increases the proposer's incentive to ''price high,'' and so v U increases. We next consider the incentive for effort coordination. We will assume that firm B is the proposer. 19 We will also assume that X X Ö a ) b s 1 and that a s b s l a for 0 -l -1. The parameter l measures the value of coordination. We can apply Proposition 1 to show that a first-best contract exists for these parameters.
The following proposition characterizes optimal ownership ( ) shares u , u . These shares maximize the joint profits. such that: selling to firm A for a high price very attractive. Another way to state this idea is that the larger is firm B's share, the closer it is to being a residual claimant.
To evaluate the performance of the shotgun rule, we compare joint profits with first-best joint profits. In the following example, we X X Ö assume that a s 2, b s 1, and a s b s l a . We show that the shotgun rule achieves nearly full efficiency for all values of l, and that this efficiency is decreasing in l.
( 19. The results for the case that firm A is the proposer are similar, but as we ) discuss later the rule does not perform as well. The results for other values of a ) 1 are similar. As a increases, dissolution efficiency must be increasingly sacrificed in order to obtain effort coordination. This is because the optimal shares for dissolution become more lopsided, giving less ownership to firm B and hence working against effort coordination. However, the value of effort coordination also increases as a increases. This second effort is stronger and the optimal shares always coordinate effort. As a increases, the shotgun rule continues to perform well. When a s 3, for instance, the ratio of joint profits to first-best profits ranges between 99.7% and 94.9% .
If firm A is the proposer, the shotgun contract does not perform as well. Firm A will never choose a price higher than firm B's highest valuation b. This limits the ability of firm B to make a profit by selling its shares for a high price. Because effort coordination is more difficult, the optimal share contracts achieve lower joint profits.
Price Competition
Next we consider a second common termination rule, price competition. This rule is also known as a first-price or winner's-bid auction. At termination, both firms bid for the partnership. The firm whose bid is higher buys the other firm's share at a price that is equal to the higher bid.
When the firms have identical distributions of valuations, price ( competition dissolves the partnership efficiently Crampton et al., ) 1987; McAfee, 1992 . Although both partners understate their true valuations, monotonicity of the symmetric equilibrium pricing strategies implies that the partner with the higher valuation submits a higher bid. We find that this efficiency result is not robust to the introduction of asymmetry. When partners are not identical, they will employ different equilibrium bidding strategies. As a general intuition, the dominant firm will understate its valuations by more. As a consequence of this asymmetry, there will be some states of the world in which firm A has a higher valuation, but submits a lower bid and does not obtain the partnership.
Another consequence of asymmetry is that closed-form solutions for the equilibrium strategies of the partners do not exist. In our analysis, we therefore analyze a simpler game where the firms are restricted to using bidding strategies that are linear in the valuation of the partnership. The restriction to linear strategies gives us approximate equilibria of the game. 20 Rather than present a full analysis, we give intuition and then present concrete results for the parameters a s 2, b s 1.
First we consider termination. We find that to maximize efficiency at termination, it is optimal for the dominant firm to have a larger share. Again the intuition is the same as in our analysis of the first-best contracts. However when firm A is strictly dominant, termination is never fully efficient.
Second, we consider coordination. In order to coordinate effort, it may be necessary to reduce the dominant firm's share below that which is optimal for termination. As with the shotgun rule, when firm B has a large share, it cares a lot about the profit it makes by selling out to firm A for a high price when firm A has a high valuation.
In the next example, we consider the case that a s 2, b s 1, and
For most values of l, price competition coordinates effort and achieves nearly full efficiency at dissolution. For very high values of l, however, effort is not coordinated.
Example 3: When a s 2, first best joint profits are given by w v 4 x E max v , v s 1.083. Under price competition with optimal shares, A B effort is coordinated for l F 0.85. The ratio of joint profits to first best profits is 99.9% at l s 0. Joint profits are decreasing in l down to 93.8% at l s 0.85. For l ) 0.85, effort is not coordinated. The ratio of joint profits to first best profits increases from 53.4% at l s 0.85 to ( ) 87% at l s 1. See Fig. 2 .
The optimal contract coordinates effort as long as this is possible. For l ) 0.85, there is no assignment of positive shares that induces firm B to coordinate effort. When effort is not coordinated, the firms' valuations have symmetric distributions. The optimal share 1 1 ( ) structure is , , and termination is efficient. But the loss in effi-2 2 ciency due to the coordination failure is significant. 20. We adopted this assumption to obtain analytic expressions for the equilibrium strategies. This in turn allows us to perform comparative statics. Without this assumption, equilibrium strategies can only be solved for numerically. The restriction can be motivated by appealing to bounded-rationality arguments. The firms may prefer to have an a priori bidding rule in the price competition-a rule that is specified before the firms learn their valuations. If, in addition, the allowable complexity of the rule is constrained, then the restriction to linear rules is plausible. The equilibrium in linear strategies is an « -equilibrium of the general game for an « that is generally quite small. For example, in the case where a s 2 and b s 1, « ranges between 3% and 7% depending on the shares.
For l F 0.85, the effort constraint is binding. The shares that ( ) ( ) maximize efficiency at termination are u , u s 1, 0 . This is be-
A B
cause A's understating its bid generates most of the inefficiency at ( ) termination. The shares 1, 0 completely remove firm A's incentive to understate its bid. However, these extremal shares never coordinate effort. The optimal share is computed by increasing firm B's share until it is just willing to coordinate effort.
For other values of a the analysis is similar. Price competition generally does well at dissolving the partnership. The only real problem is that it may fail to coordinate effort. As a increases, it becomes easier to coordinate effort because coordination is more valuable. This improves the performance of the rule. For example, ( ) when a s 3, even the shares 1, 0 succeed in coordinating effort. Joint profits are now 99.7% of first best profits for all values of l.
Comparison of the Shotgun Rule and Price Competition
Here we compare the performance of the two termination rules.
( ) McAfee's 1992 efficiency result for price competition does not extend to asymmetric distributions. In our asymetric environments ( ) a ) b , neither price competition nor the shotgun rule achieves efficient termination for any choice of ownership shares. Price competition does generally do slightly better than the shotgun rule at termination, because the trading price is based on the bids of both partners and so is able to get closer to the true value of the partnership. The differences in termination performance are however very small. Both rules do well at termination. The more important comparison between the rules is how they coordinate effort. The shotgun rule has a strong advantage. The essence of the coordination problem is as follows. When effort is coordinated, firm A is likely to have a high valuation of the partnership. Firm B must be able to collect some of this value in order to be willing to coordinate. Under the shotgun rule, firm B can simply propose a high price. Under price competition, it is hard for firm B to benefit from a high v . If firm A is bidding low, then firm B will bid A low as well. Bidding high would not achieve the objective of selling at a high price. Instead, firm B would run the risk of acquiring the partnership. Because it is harder for firm B to benefit from a high v , A it is harder to find shares for which price competition induces coordination.
When a s 2 and b s 1, joint profits as a function of l under the shotgun rule and price competition are shown in Figure 2 .
FIGURE 2. JOINT PROFITS UNDER THE SHOTGUN RULE AND PRICE COMPETITION
Because the shotgun rule is better at effort coordination, it is in a sense the better rule. However, formally the two institutions cannot ( ) be ranked. When l is low l F 0.45 , price competition is a slightly better institution. 21 The effort constraint is easily satisfied, and price competition is slightly better at termination. When 0.45 -l -0.85, the shotgun rule is better because it is able to coordinate effort at less cost in termination efficiency. For l ) 0.85, price competition is unable to induce effort coordination. The shotgun rule is much more efficient in this range. As discussed above, as the value of a increases, the efficiency of price competition vis-a-vis the shotgun rule im-Á proves.
Robustness
In our analysis, we have restricted attention to uniform distributions of firms' private valuation. A natural question is how the results extend to more general distributions. Because the intuitions that we have developed do not depend on the structure of the uniform distributions, we expect that they do extend to more general environments. In the analysis of first best contracts, in particular, it should in general be easier to meet the balanced-budget, efficiency, and incen-( tive constraints when the dominant firm is more dominant Corollary 21. The difference is too small to illustrate in the figure. In the analysis of simple contracts, the shotgun rule should in general be better at coordinating effort, and price competition should be better at termination. For example, the insight that firm B is in a good position to capture rents from firm A when it is the proposer is not related to the structure of the uniform distribution. If the distribution of firm A's valuation v were tightly concentrated around a A ( ) single large value v, then firm B could propose a price slightly below v and earn almost all of the surplus on its shares. With regard to efficiency of the simple contracts, there may be distributions for which both the rules perform more and less well. The uniform distributions were chosen for simplicity and do not have any particular compatibility with these rules. 
Conclusion
We have examined the ability of contracts to induce profit maximization in partnerships. We find that a first best contract maximizing joint profits for a wide range of environments. We have also compared the performance of two common termination rules. We find that both rules can perform well if ownership shares are chosen appropriately . In the environments we consider, we find that the rules cannot be ranked. The shotgun rule is better at inducing effort coordination, but price competition dissolves the partnership more efficiently. A testable implication is that the shotgun rule is a better termination rule than price competition when the coordination of effort is important. Thus one might expect to see the shotgun rule in research joint ventures where effort involves an intellectual-property component, because it seems likely that this type of expert effort is particularly difficult to observe.
22. One interesting way to extend our analysis would be to fix a simple contract and to calculate upper and lower bounds for efficiency over all possible distributions of valuations. This is however beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Appendix: Proofs
expected profit under the mechanism s , t when its valuation of the venture is v and it reports v after the effort A has been chosen.
When firm B chooses the effort direction A, the firms' interim expected payoffs are given by 
and as a result chooses to report v s min a r a n v , b . This gives it Ã B B an ex ante expected utility of
This is quadratic in n, and attains a minimum at n s a r a b r b .
v y U n : 4 Thus, the optimal mechanism among the family s , t is the one
where n s a r a b r b . Substituting the optimal n into B's ex ante
B therefore will choose the effort direction A if and only if
Dividing through by a y a ) 0 gives the condition S . By
, we must also have that b s b X , and so there is no difference between e s A and e s B. The effort choice is degenerate in this case, and a first-best contract ) exists.
I ( ) Proof of Corollary 1:
The right-hand side of the inequality 7.1 is increasing in b X for all a X . By the stochastic dominance assumption, 23 . Note that after choosing effort direction B instead of A, firm B cannot exercise y n : its ownership right and claim its part of the partnership, because, since s, t is individually rational after it chooses effort A, doing so will prove that it chose effort B and violated the terms of the contract.
ab G a X b X ; therefore, for all a X , the right-hand side is maximized when b X s ab r a X , and we can eliminate b X from the right-hand side to obtain
an inequality that implies the inequality 7.1 . That is, a r 6 b q
bb r 3a F f a , where f a s a r 6 b q ab r 3 a . The function f is convex in a X and is therefore maximized at a corner solution. Suppose that the following conditions holds: It follows from the last lemma that a partnership with ownership ( ) structure u , 1 y u can be dissolved efficiently and subject to indi-( ) vidual rationality if and only if f u G 0.
To see that the set of ownership structures that can be dissolved efficiently is convex, it is enough to check that f is concave. We have structure that maximizes f u can be dissolved. That is, the structure that is the easiest to dissolve efficiently is given as the solution to ( ) max f u , u subject to u q u s 1.
A B A B
Because f is concave, the solution to the first-order conditions is the solution to the problem. P P C P P C dp ( ) ( ) Thus d r dp P v , p s 0 implies
( ) f p dp C ( 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) X ( ) 2 ( ) and d r dp P v , p -0 if and only if F p f p r f p y 2 y
For uniform distributions of the chooser's valuap C C ( tion, this inequality holds trivially. More generally it follows from ) standard hazard-rate conditions. Thus there is at most one solution ( ) ( ) to d r dp P v , p s 0. Moreover, because
and d P r dp is continuous, such a solution exists.
-u y F p v . 
